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ABSTRACT 
 
This study attempts to determine the possible effects of individualism on industry volatility. The 
implications of this for behavioural finance are extensive, showing firstly that different industries 
react differently to behavioural biases and secondly that overconfidence is a possible driver of 
the positive effect of individualism on industry volatility. The country selection process was 
relatively objective, taking two countries with high individualism indexes and two with low 
indexes and including one with a medium index value. The result was a sample of the United 
States of America, the United Kingdom, South Africa, China and Taiwan. The industry selection 
process was more subjective. Industries were selected which should have a higher propensity to 
behavioural biases with lower book to market ratios (software and computer services industry 
and pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry) and other industries which should not be as 
strongly affected by behavioural biases (banks, mining, oil and gas producers, and mobile 
telecommunications industries).  In order to correct for ARCH effects the series’ were modelled 
using a GARCH (1, 1) model. The resulting residuals, which showed no autocorrelation, were 
then used to conduct panel data regressions on each of the industries. The results confirmed that 
individualism had a positive effect on volatility in the industries which were expected (software 
and computer services and pharmaceuticals and biotechnology industries). However, it was also 
determined that the banks industry was significantly affected by individualism, an effect which it 
was hypothesised, was due to the individualism of employees as opposed to investors. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH) has been under intense scrutiny since first being 
described by Fama (1965). The cornerstone of the EMH is the assumption that investors act in a 
perfectly rational, utility maximising manner. In recent years, the EMH has been under attack 
from the study of Behavioural Finance (BF), which provides a holistic theory of market 
behaviour by removing the assumption that market participants act in a perfectly rational, utility 
maximising way. The much-debated area of BF is the result of the reconciliation of psychology 
to the field of finance, which attempts to fill the gaps left by the Efficient Markets Hypothesis. 
 
According to the EMH, any excess volatility of returns should be due to a measurable excess in 
the risk of the discounted value of the future cash flows of the asset (Bulkley and Tonks, 1992).  
However, volatility over and above what is implied by risk metrics has often been identified in 
security returns. Many explanations have been developed to explain this phenomenon; however 
none have been conclusively agreed upon (Shiller, 2003). Most of the explanations are attributed 
to behavioural biases of investors since non-behavioural risk metrics cannot fully account for the 
anomalies. Two of the several behavioural biases found empirically to have an effect on 
volatility are investor overconfidence and the self-attribution bias (Gervais and Odean, 2001; 
Daniel Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam, 1998). 
 
Investor overconfidence is defined as the phenomenon of investors overweighting the accuracy 
of their analysis, while the self-attribution bias is the idea that investors attribute successful 
outcomes to their ability and failures to external factors (Bem, 1965). If one considers 
overconfident investors to be noise traders as is suggested in Shefrin and Statman (1994) – a 
parallel which is possible when considering the definition of noise traders as investors trading on 
poor or no information by De Long (2005) or that noise traders do not have rational reasons to 
trade by Tetlock (2006); and also the similarities in the results attributed to noise traders and 
overconfident investors including increased volatility and volume (Ramiah , Xu and Moosa, 
2015) – research on the effect of noise traders on volatility can then be applied here. The 
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existence of noise traders (as a separate class of investor to informed investors) was proven by 
Goetzmann and Massa (1999). Noise traders have been found to affect volatility in numerous 
studies, despite the fact that the lasting volatility effects of noise traders is a direct contravention 
of the EMH since these effects should be offset by rational arbitrageurs. As noise traders force 
market prices away from fundamental prices, arbitrageurs take advantage of the discrepancy, 
forcing prices back to fundamental values. 
 
Mathematically, volatility is a measure of the variation in trading prices over a given period of 
time and is captured by the standard deviation of the change in prices over time. It represents the 
risk of investing in the security as well as the inherent risk of the company itself (Butler and 
Pinkerton, 2007). The latter being due to the fact that future cashflows for the company are 
uncertain. However, volatility can also show an uncertainty in the pricing of an asset. If 
uncertainty is present among investors, prices will change more frequently. As an example, given 
two investors interested in the same security, neither of which has perfect knowledge of what the 
fundamental value of the security is: investor 1 may consider the current price of the security to 
be too high and therefore sell his investment in the security, driving the price down. At the new 
lower price however, investor 2 considers the security to be undervalued and therefore invests 
more. This drives the price back up. This results in higher standard deviations of price changes 
assuming a normal distribution. Therefore in industries or securities where less information is 
required in order to make an informed investment decision, share value is easier to determine and 
therefore discrepancies between share price and share value are easier to exploit. In those cases it 
makes sense that noise traders (overconfident investors or investors suffering from the self-
attribution bias) would have a reduced effect on volatility since it will be easier for rational 
investors to arbitrage away any discrepancies. This concept is also discussed in Scheinkman and 
Xiong (2003) who develop a continuous-time equilibrium model in which increases in volatility 
are caused by discrepancies in valuations caused by overconfidence 
 
The existence of investor overconfidence and the self-attribution bias has also been shown to 
have a positive effect on momentum profits (Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam, 1998). The 
momentum effect states that securities which have performed well in the recent past will 
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continue to perform well into the near future (Chui, Titman and Wei, 2010). Overconfidence and 
the self-attribution bias propagate the momentum effect by causing public information 
supporting the private analysis of an investor to be seen as confirmation of his abilities. This 
increases his confidence and causes him to trade more, forcing the security price in the same 
direction. Due to the self-attribution bias, public information not supporting initial private 
analysis has very little effect on the confidence of the investor (Daniel, Hirshleifer and 
Subrahmanyam, (1998)).  
 
It is interesting to note that overconfidence and the self-attribution bias may be nested within a 
different behavioural bias – one which is related to culture (Yates, Lee and Shinotsuka, 1996). 
The study of individualism shows that people from different cultures have different loci of 
responsibility, whether for the self or the community. This cultural bias may have a strong 
impact on overconfidence and as a result on volatility (leading to momentum). People brought up 
in individualistic cultures are taught that they are in some way superior to their neighbours while 
those brought up in collectivistic cultures are taught that everyone has faults. When reduced to its 
simplest form this is a question of Nature versus Nurture: one of the oldest questions in the field 
of psychology. 
 
The application of psychological methods to the field of finance is an attempt to describe how 
and why investors stray from utility maximisation and was first propagated through the Prospect 
Theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), which showed that people are risk seeking in the 
plane of losses and risk averse in the plane of gains. In other words, they found that when 
individuals are faced with a loss, they would prefer to take on a larger loss with a lower 
probability than a smaller loss with a higher probability. However, when faced with a gain 
individuals were more likely to choose a smaller gain with more certainty than a larger gain with 
less certainty. The expected gain/loss was not necessarily taken into consideration. This 
collaboration between academics in the fields of finance and psychology was the first of its kind 
and the first to demonstrate a deviation from perfectly rational investor behaviour. BF has 
received considerable attention in recent years; however it has yet to result in a hypothesis that 
could be a reliable substitute for the EMH. New methods and schools of thought are constantly 
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being introduced to BF in an attempt to create a sound basis for the substitution of the EMH, 
including the Adaptive Markets Hypothesis of Lo (2004), which takes the basis of the EMH and 
amends behavioural factors to it. 
 
Since the development of Prospect Theory several other areas of psychology have been applied 
to the field of Finance with differing levels of success. One of these areas is that of cultural 
psychology and, in particular, the idea of individualism. The primary premise of individualism is 
that cultures can be divided into those which are more individualistic and those which are more 
collectivistic, the differentiation being that those which are more individualistic contain people 
who consider themselves to be independent from the crowd while people in collectivistic 
cultures view themselves as part of a whole, creating an “interdependent self-construct” (Chu, 
Titman and Wei, 2010). The field of individualism in general was revolutionised by Hofstede 
(1980) who conducted a survey study of IBM employees across 40 countries and constructed an 
individualism index from the results. The aim of Hofstede (1980)’s analysis was to measure the 
cultural diversity of countries using 5 different indices, namely: individualism, masculinity, 
power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and long term orientation. These results were later 
extended and conformed to 51 countries in total in Hofstede (2001). Hofstede (1980, 2001)’s 
results have formed the basis for studies across several different areas of research, which 
document behavioural differences between countries, including the field of Finance. 
 
Individualism was originally introduced as a behavioural trait of a population. In the remainder 
of the current paper it is applied to a subset of a population, being investors/traders. A strong link 
has also been shown to exist between individualism and overconfidence, as well as the self-
attribution bias. According to Markus and Kitayama (1991) people in individualistic societies 
focus more on their own attributes and they, along with Heine, Lehman, Markus and Kitayama 
(1999) show that more individualistic cultures believe that their abilities are above average while 
less individualistic cultures do not. In this way it can be said that the individualism effect is a 
result of overconfident investors relying less on fundamental valuations. 
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Chu, Titman and Wei (2010) consider the effects of individualism on equity market volatility, 
finding a statistically significant relationship. It is suggested that this relationship is caused by 
the effect of individualism on the performance of momentum strategies through similar investor 
behaviour; specifically overconfidence and the self-attribution bias. A relationship between 
individualism and volatility could therefore indicate the existence of overconfidence and (or) the 
self-attribution bias in an industry on which individualism has a significant effect.  This study 
attempts to extend this line of thought by determining whether certain industries are more 
susceptible to the effects of individualism across countries in order to determine whether the 
effects of individualism which have been found to be prominent between countries have 
differing effects on industries within countries. This could lead to the conclusion that 
fundamental valuations are more important in certain industries than in others due to the fact that 
the effects of these behavioural biases have differing effects. Results such as these will inform 
which industries are most affected by behavioural biases. One could also determine the overall 
effects of individualism on a given market through the industrial composition of the market. 
 
Using the results obtained by Hofstede (2001) as a starting point, daily international financial 
data at the industry level will be tested to determine which, if any, industries are most affected by 
individualism and which are least affected. The data set would have to include complete 
international daily security prices over a lengthy period of time, which would allow for the 
calculation of returns and volatility. It would also have to include industry classification data and 
Hofstede (2001)’s individualism index. Several measures which could affect industry volatility 
will be included to capture potential exogenous variables such as exchange rate volatility or 
systematic volatility. Several statistical methodologies would have to be used to determine the 
appropriateness of the data leading to a regression analysis. 
 
 The present study introduces a GARCH process, which it has been found, is far more accurate in 
modelling and predicting volatility than a random walk model (a model which assumes no 
autocorrelation) according to Jones (2011). ARCH (AutoRegressive Conditional 
Heteroschedasticity) models assume volatility clustering (periods of high volatility and periods 
of low volatility) which is conditional on previous periods’ error terms. An extension of the 
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ARCH model to the Generalised ARCH (GARCH) model allows for a more parsimonious 
specification by including past (conditional) volatility values. This is required when the volatility 
is conditional on both past volatility and error terms, demonstrating an AutoReggressive Moving 
Average (ARMA) process. 
 
ARCH/GARCH effects have been found in many series’ of financial returns and the existence of 
volatility clustering is an accepted characteristic of financial markets (Lux and Marchesi, 2000). 
In order to determine the appropriateness of data for use in an ARCH/GARCH process, several 
tests must be run on the data. These include, but are not limited to, tests for stationarity of the 
series, whether the series is independently and identically distributed, and tests for the existence 
of ARCH/GARCH effects. 
 
While analysis on the effects of individualism has been undertaken using regression analysis on 
entire markets, this is the first attempt to carry out the analysis at the industry level, meaning a 
significant contribution can be made to the areas of individualism as well as behavioural finance. 
This is also to the writer’s knowledge the first attempt at applying an ARCH/GARCH framework 
to the problem. Determining whether there is a difference in the way which industries react to 
individualism extends the current research with regards to market efficiency and overconfidence. 
This study attempts to solidify some aspects of BF through the hypothesis that some industries 
are more severely impacted by the effects of individualism, the assumption that individualism 
causes overconfidence, and therefore, the concept that the valuations of some industries rely 
more heavily on fundamental value than others. In so doing, this study shall attempt to show that 
the EMH is subjective at best. 
 
1.1 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE AND HYPOTHESES 
 
The aim of the current study is to determine the effect of overconfidence through the cultural 
preconception of individualism on industries of differing levels of fundamental asset to security 
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value (book to market) ratios and in turn the susceptibility of different industries to pricing 
uncertainty due to behavioural biases is uncovered. 
 
1.1.1 PRIMARY HYPOTHESIS 
Hypothesis 1: Individualism has diverse effects on industry trade volume and return volatility. 
Hypothesis 1.1: Individualism has a larger effect on industries which are seen to have 
lower book to market value ratios. 
Hypothesis 1.2: Individualism has a smaller effect on industries which are seen to have 
higher book to market value ratios. 
 
1.1.2 SECONDARY HYPOTHESIS 
Hypothesis 2: The effect of individualism on industry volume and volatility is transferred via 
investor overconfidence. 
Hypothesis 2.1: Industries with lower fundamental asset to market value ratios are more 
susceptible to the effects of overconfidence. 
Hypothesis 2.2: Industries with higher fundamental asset to market value ratios are less 
susceptible to the effects of overconfidence. 
 
The study continues with an analysis of the literature relating to 7 different areas which are 
relevant to the study in Chapter 2. After the literature review the theoretical framework of the 
methodologies used are discussed in Chapter 3 before the data and methodology are defined in 
Chapter 4. Chapter 5 contains a discussion of the results and Chapter 6 concludes. References 
and appendices are found after the conclusion. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The current study gains insight from literature from several different and diverse areas of 
research. In the literature review Efficient Markets Hypothesis is discussed before moving on to 
Behavioural Finance and evidence for momentum strategies. The primary independent variable, 
individualism, is considered as well as its relationship with overconfidence. The relationship 
between overconfidence and excess volatility is analysed and finally industry specific volatility 
literature is reviewed. 
 
2.1 EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIS 
 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) is the culmination of centuries of development in return 
distributions and was first described and formulated by Fama (1970). The Random Walk Theory 
is one of the developing principles behind the EMH and was first introduced to the field of 
finance by Regnault (1863). Regnault, a broker by trade, used a form of binomial distribution to 
show that the probability of price increases or decreases were equal, effectively proving that 
price movements were random. Interestingly, he attributed the Random Walk hypothesis to the 
lack of information as well as different interpretations of information among investors, possibly 
also pre-empting the EMH (Jovanovic & Le Gall, 2001). The Random Walk Theory, when 
applied to share prices, asserts that security price changes are independently distributed and do 
not follow any specific path. This leads to the assertion that one cannot consistently achieve 
returns in excess of average market returns on a risk-adjusted basis, since predicting share prices 
or share price patterns should be impossible. Fama (1970)’s definition stated that market prices 
reflect all possible information. However, he characterised this by formulating three levels of 
efficiency: weak form efficiency allows for market prices to reflect only historical market 
information; semi-strong form efficiency states that prices reflect both historical prices and all 
publicly available information; and strong form efficiency is achieved only when all publicly and 
privately held information is reflected in market prices. Fama (1970) made three assumptions in 
the development of the hypothesis, namely that there are no transaction costs, there is costless 
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information and there is investor agreement with regards to the information received. Even 
without these assumptions markets should maintain a high-level of efficiency. Fama (1970) gives 
the example that as long as investment decisions are made while considering all available 
information, even large transactions costs will not necessarily inhibit prices from reflecting all 
available information. Likewise, if a sufficient number of investors have access to all available 
information markets should tend to efficiency. 
 
Volumes of research have found evidence in favour of the Efficient Markets Hypothesis in its 
three separate forms, to be discussed below. Tests of the weak form of efficiency are generally 
supported in empirical studies. These show that investment strategies based on past prices alone 
cannot earn returns higher than the market or that markets follow a random walk. Roll (1978) 
finds the Treasury Bill market to be weak form efficient and Alexander (1961, 1964) finds that 
Y% filter trading rules (buying the top Y% of performing stocks while selling the bottom Y% 
over a given period of time) do not outperform buy-and-hold strategies (buying shares based on 
fundamental analysis and holding them for a given period of time) when transaction costs are 
included. In a South African context Smith, Jefferis and Ryoo (2002) find that the JSE follows a 
random walk while Jefferis and Smith (2005) use a GARCH model to show that the JSE has 
shown weak form efficiency over a period of 11 years at the end of the 20
th
 and beginning of the 
21
st
 century. In direct contravention of the weak form of efficiency however, is the existence and 
persistence of noise traders. As mentioned earlier, this appears frequently in empirical work, 
which will be discussed in Section 1.1.6. 
 
The semi-strong form of market efficiency states that prices reflect all publicly available 
information. When analysing stock splits, Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969) find evidence of 
this. They consider that excessively high rates of returns prior to stock splits are due to increases 
in expected earnings and dividends and as information is disseminated, these expectations are 
accepted as true, driving returns even higher. This indicates an integration of public information 
among investors. Ball and Brown (1968) also support semi-strong form efficiency when looking 
at earnings announcements. Ball and Brown (1968) create expected firm income measures by 
analysing firm incomes in the past. They then create the unexpected change in income by 
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subtracting the actual income from the expected income and find that returns for firms where the 
unexpected change in income is negative are lower than would otherwise be expected. This is 
another example of public information being incorporated into share prices. In an analysis of the 
adjustment of market prices to earnings and dividend announcements on the Malaysian Stock 
Exchange Ahmed, Hussin and Ying (2010) find significant evidence of prices adjusting to the 
new information with dividend announcements having a stronger effect than earnings 
announcements. Increases in both earnings and dividends resulted in higher abnormal returns, 
while decreases result in lower abnormal returns. However, in tests of earning announcements on 
the Indian Stock Market, Mallikarjunappa and Dsouza (2013) find that prices are slow in 
adjusting and reflect inefficiency. It is noted by Mallikarjunappa and Dsouza (2013) that it would 
be possible to earn abnormal returns up to 30 days after earnings announcements are made, 
indicating that this information is not entirely incorporated in share prices for a lengthy period 
after the announcement is made – a definite breach of market efficiency. In a study of the 
efficiency of futures prices in the Hog Futures Market, Leuthold and Hartman (1979) also find 
against the semi-strong form of market efficiency. Econometric models designed to predict 
future hog prices by incorporating all publicly available information often are more accurate in 
predicting hog prices than the futures market itself, suggesting market inefficiency. 
 
Strong form efficiency, which states that all information, private and public, is reflected in 
security prices, is not as well supported. Scholes (1969) shows that corporate insiders have 
monopolistic access to information about their firms and Niederhoffer and Osborne (1966) show 
that they can use this information to generate profits, directly contravening the strong form of 
market efficiency. Specifically, Niederhoffer and Osborne (1966) find that the chances of an 
advance after a decline is three times higher than a second decline, and that subsequent to two 
consecutive moves in the same direction, the chances of a third move in the same direction are 
almost twice as high compared to the same move after two moves in different directions. Kara 
and Denning (1998) find that US markets are not strong form efficient by using a log-linear 
regression of abnormal returns. The analysis was done on known trades based on insider 
information and Kara and Denning (1998) prove that insiders were able to earn profit from these 
trades. Jensen (1968) however, finds that mutual funds are not able to achieve risk adjusted 
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returns over and above the market when accounting for transaction fees, supporting market 
efficiency. The basis of this analysis is the definition of mutual fund managers as owners of 
insider information. If mutual funds cannot capitalise on their insider information, this indicates 
that security prices have already accounted for this information, showing efficiency in the 
market. 
 
2.2 BEHAVIOURAL FINANCE 
 
The assumption by the EMH of investor agreement is further predicated on the assumption of 
rational, utility maximising market participants. The claim of BF is that market participants are 
affected by biases, which force them away from utility maximisation in their investment 
decisions. The current study falls within the realm of BF since it describes the inclusion of 
behavioural biases in investment decisions. 
 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) were among the first to disagree with the view of utilitarian, risk 
averse investors. Their development of Prospect Theory was based on survey results and has 
formed the basis of behavioural finance. They found that investors overweight events which they 
consider to be certain relative to outcomes which are merely probable (the certainty effect), and 
are risk averse in the plane of gains while being risk seeking in the plane of losses (the reflection 
effect). Barberis, Huang and Santos (2001) show that models based on Prospect Theory better 
explain factors such as high volatility of returns and equity risk premia. The model developed by 
Barberis, Huang and Santos (2001) is based on prior investment outcomes, stating that investors 
become less risk averse after a large investment return. The investor then implements decreased 
discount rates in calculating discounted cashflows, pushing the price up higher. An opposite 
effect occurs for negative returns. 
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Other evidence in support for BF includes Coval and Shumway (2005) who find that investors 
who make losses in the morning show higher risk-taking activity in the afternoon and Baker and 
Wurgler (2007) who show that sentiment affects markets as a whole. 
 
Lo (2004) introduced a middle ground to EMH vs. BF. The Adaptive Markets Hypothesis states 
that markets exhibit changing levels of efficiency. Lo (2004) considers that investor behaviour 
evolves over time by natural selection. The work of Simon (1955) on bounded rationality – the 
concept that investors are only rational up to a certain point due to the computational complexity 
of being perfectly rational – and satisficing, as opposed to optimizing, investor behaviour, is a 
strong influence on the work of Lo (2004). The hypothesis of Adaptive Markets assumes that 
individuals use heuristics to adapt satisfactorily to an environment, however if that environment 
were then to change, those adaptations would be conceived as behavioural biases if they were not 
suited to the new environment. 
 
2.3 MOMENTUM STRATEGIES 
 
A momentum strategy involves buying past winners and selling past losers under the hypothesis 
that securities which have increased in price in the near past will continue to increase in price in 
the near future and securities which have decreased in price in the near past will continue to 
decrease in price in the near future. The existence and success of momentum strategies is an 
anomaly since it indicates that security prices do not follow a random walk but are rather serially 
correlated. 
 
De Bondt and Thaler (1985) uncover weak form market inefficiencies on the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) by proving that share price momentum can predict reversals after a three year 
period. They show that if a share has been increasing in price over the past three years it will 
decrease in price over the next three years. They consider this to be an overreaction by investors 
to positive price movements and a subsequent correction. 
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Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) show that over a three to twelve month period significant returns 
can be made by investing in a relative strength momentum strategy on the NYSE and American 
Stock Exchange (AMEX). However, after twelve months significant reversals meant large losses 
for those maintaining the strategy. Hsieh and Hodnett (2011) find similar results on the JSE 
suggesting that the phenomenon is internationally relevant. Hsieh and Hodnett (2011) also note 
that contrarian investing (using an investment strategy which contradicts momentum strategies) 
may be a safe haven during market turmoil due to its low correlation with the market during 
those periods. 
 
The existence of momentum profits has also been found to be related to overconfidence and the 
self-attribution bias. Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) theorise that overconfident 
investors overweight any private information they receive, causing market overreactions which 
are corrected over time with the introduction of new public information. However, if the new 
public information confirms the earlier private information, self-attribution bias will cause these 
investors to become more confident and leads to a further overreaction. This continued 
overreaction is the cause of momentum profits according to Daniel, Hirshleifer and 
Subrahmanyam (1998). 
 
More specifically, Chui, Titman and Wei (2010) show that the link between overconfidence and 
momentum profits is driven by individualism. Chui, Titman and Wei (2010) find a 0.6% 
difference in average monthly momentum profits – as measured on a zero-cost momentum 
portfolio – between countries with individualism indexes in the top and bottom 30%, with those 
in the top 30% showing the higher profits. 
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2.4 INDIVIDUALISM 
 
The study of independence forms one of two key areas in cultural psychology research. The area 
was first developed by Hofstede (1980) where a survey was given to IBM employees in 40 
different countries and an independence index was created. The study was later extended to 50 
countries in Hofstede (2001). This independence index has been used in several studies since. 
Franke, Hofstede and Bond (1991) conduct an analysis of the effect of all of the Hofstede (1980) 
cultural variables on economic growth in 18 – 20 countries. The results show that individualism 
has a negative effect on economic growth over the sample period, and Franke, Hofstede and 
Bond (1991) conclude that individualism is a liability in a context where cohesion drives 
economic growth. 
 
Markus and Kitayama (1991) note that Western cultures are representative of an independent 
self-construal, while Eastern cultures are more interdependent. They define independent people 
as follows: 
 
“…behavior is organized and made meaningful primarily by reference to one’s 
own internal repertoire of thoughts, feelings, and action, rather than by reference 
to the thoughts, feelings, and actions of others” (p. 226). 
 
Interdependence they define as: 
 
“…seeing oneself as part of an encompassing social relationship and recognizing 
that one’s behaviour is determined, contingent on, and, to a large extent, 
organized by what the actor perceives to be the thoughts, feelings, and actions of 
others in the relationship” (p. 227). 
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Weber, Shenkar and Raveh (1996) also consider the effect of several of Hofstede (1980)’s 
cultural indices on the result of merger and acquisition deals. They find that cultural differences 
between merging/acquiring companies predict stress, poor attitudes towards the 
merger/acquisition or cooperation better than corporate culture differentials. This is further proof 
that business decisions are severely affected by national culture. 
 
Kachelmeier and Shehata (1997) conducted a series of trials with participants managing fictional 
books and tested under what circumstances audits were requested from the parties given that 
audit requests cost “money”. The results showed that while in a setting of high anonymity all 
“countries” tested were more demanding of audits, but in a setting of low anonymity countries 
with less individualism were less likely to request audits. This indicates that individuals in 
collectivistic cultures are more likely to trust their peers in an open environment. 
 
Yang (1981) finds evidence of collectivism in China, even in the more modern segments 
of the population. Church et al. (2006) find that American and Anglo-Australian people 
are individualistic in nature while Chinese, Malaysian and Japanese people are 
collectivistic. 
 
2.5 INDIVIDUALISM AND OVERCONFIDENCE 
 
It has been hypothesised by many that individualistic cultures are more prone to overconfidence 
and self-attribution bias than are collectivistic cultures. This is mostly attributed to different loci 
of control: people of individualistic cultures focus on themselves while those in collectivistic 
cultures focus on their peers. 
 
According to Heine et al. (1999), this effect is attributable to the upbringing of the youth. They 
note that in individualistic cultures (most notably North America) children are encouraged to 
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think that they are special and capable of anything, while those in collectivistic cultures (most 
notably Japan) are made to focus more on their inadequacies and weaknesses in order to correct 
these aspects. This self-critical perspective of the Japanese is also found by Doi (1973) to name 
just one. According to Biais, Hilton, Mazurier and Pouget (2005), self-monitoring like this 
should cause a decrease in the prevalence of overconfidence. 
 
In a study of negotiators from the United States of America and Japan, Gelfand, Higgins, Nishii, 
Raver and Dominguez (2002) find that Americans are more self-serving (prone to self-attribution 
bias) than their Japanese counterparts. This conclusion held across four different methodologies 
conducted by Gelfand et al (2002). 
 
In a multi-cultural study of the United States of America and several Eastern countries, Lee et al. 
(1995) find that the US has the strongest form of peer-comparison overconfidence, which is what 
causes investors to be overly optimistic of the accuracy of their decisions according to Van den 
Steen (2004). Yates, Lee and Shinotsuka (1996) also find that individualism is clearly related to 
peer-comparison overconfidence. 
 
Chui, Titman and Wei (2010) also show very high correlations between individualism and 
trading volume and volatility, which as can be seen below is an indication of overconfident 
investors. Chui, Titman and Wei (2010) find relatively small but highly significant relationship 
between individualism and trading volume and volatility when using panel data regression of 41 
countries. 
 
2.6 OVERCONFIDENCE AND EXCESS VOLATILITY 
 
The existence of excess volatility has long plagued the study of efficient markets. Market prices 
should, in an efficient market, represent the sum of all discounted cashflows expected to accrue 
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to the asset holder. If this is the case, then it is noted by Shiller (2003) that the maximum 
possible variance of the forecast (market prices) cannot exceed the variance of the variable being 
forecasted (future cashflows). However, this is consistently found to be the reality (Shiller, 1981; 
LeRoy and Porter, 1981; West, 1988). Since overconfident investors can be described as noise 
traders (Shefrin and Statman, 1994), the research done thereupon also applies here. It has been 
argued by a few (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980; Black, 1986) that markets cannot be truly 
efficient without the existence of noise traders. Inefficiencies must exist in the market in order 
for informed investors to have a reason to uncover them. The investigations which informed 
investors do in search of these inefficiencies are what drive prices to equilibrium. 
 
Based on the above it can be seen that the mere existence of noise traders leading to excess 
volatility is almost expected by the EMH. However, given that these noise traders should be 
arbitraged out of the market, the persistence of excess volatility caused by noise traders 
contradicts the EMH. Friedman (1953) and Figlewski (1979) both agree that these irrational 
investors should disappear from the market in the long run due to the depletion of their capital. 
Friedman (1953) creates a model which caters for the distribution of wealth amongst individuals 
and results in irrational investors being marginalised. Figlewski (1979) considers bettors of horse 
racers and finds that the information disseminated by handicappers is completely internalised by 
rational bettors but not by irrational bettors. Many people argue that noise traders are simply 
replaced by other noise traders. However, in an attempt to explain excess volatility during 
trading hours, French and Roll (1986) prove that 4% to 12% of daily variance is caused by 
mispricing. 
 
De Long, Schleifer, Summers and Waldmann (1991) create a model which allows for the 
persistence of noise traders by proving that they can earn higher returns than rational investors. It 
is agreed that due to the fact that noise traders are on average more bullish and trade more, they 
take on more risk. Higher risk obviously results in higher expected returns but generally in long 
run ruin. De Long et al. (1991) show that it is possible for noise traders to earn higher returns 
than rational investors and survive - and even dominate - the market. They state that because 
noise traders take on more risk, they are rewarded with higher returns, however because noise 
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traders trade on false or bad information, they will on average buy high and sell low (De Long et 
al., 1991). The result is that individual noise traders should end up bankrupt with a high 
probability or very wealthy with a low probability. On a collective basis however, it is possible 
that they can come to dominate the market. Miller (1977) argued that the smart money (money 
controlled by well-informed, rational investors), on identifying a price discrepancy, may short 
themselves completely out of the position, leaving only noise traders to set the price. This would 
result in inefficient markets with no rational investors. 
 
Several studies have been conducted on the direct relationship between overconfidence, self-
attribution bias and excess trading volatility. Gervais and Odean (2001) consider that over-
confidence is a result of the self-attribution bias since traders attribute success to their own 
ability and failures to external forces. This results in investors becoming overconfident in their 
abilities. 
 
Odean (1998) notes that overconfidence in different market players has different effects on the 
market. Of most interest is the finding that volatility is increased by overconfident traders and 
trading volume is increased by overconfident price takers, insiders or market makers. Since 
individualism increases overconfidence in an entire population, one would expect the effect to 
resolve as an increase in both volume and volatility. 
 
Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) create a model which shows that overconfidence causes 
disparities in agents’ opinions of asset fundamentals, resulting in excess volatility. In the same 
vein, it is found by Van den Steen (2004) that industries, in which there is disagreement with 
regards to the effectiveness of alternative strategies or technologies, are also prone to over 
optimism. 
 
Finally, in a study of 41 countries using Hofstede’s Individualism index Chu, Titman and Wei 
(2010) find a significant effect of individualism on both trading volume and volatility, which 
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they posit could relate to the success of momentum strategies in more individualistic countries. 
This result is the basis for the current study, which takes a more in depth view of the effects of 
individualism on markets. 
 
 
2.7 INDUSTRY VOLATILITY 
 
Cambell, Lettau, Malkiel and Xu (2001) find that there are vast differences in volatility between 
industries and find high correlations between industry and firm level volatility. Larger industries 
are found to have lower average volatilities. This is due to the fact that larger industries are made 
up of more established firms which have less volatility. Of 49 industries, 14 are found to have 
significantly positive volatility trends and seven have significantly negative volatility trends, 
indicating the vast differences in volatility properties between industries. 
 
Ben Sita (2013) shows that volatility has a spill over effect between industries and that some 
industries lead this effect while others follow. Specifically, Ben Sita (2013) shows that the 
financial and manufacturing industries lead volatility of other industries, reasons for this are not 
given. However, they show that this effect contains a feedback mechanism and the relationships 
are far more complex than a simple linear progression. They also find that these spill over effects 
exhibit a time-varying pattern and did not follow a trend following the market crash of 1987. 
 
Mazzucato (2002) finds that industry volatility peaks during times of technological innovation 
within an industry and thus concludes that industry specific volatility is due to a life cycle effect. 
When the revenue of an industry is derived more from new technologies which investors have 
little experience in valuing, the value of that industry is more difficult to determine, resulting in 
more volatility. Hou (2007) claims the volatility differences are due to differing levels of 
asymmetric information between industries. Industries for which there are large amounts of 
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information asymmetry result in less efficient markets for that industry and a higher likelihood of 
excess volatility. 
 
2.8 SUMMARY 
 
It can be seen that the EMH has a strong theoretical background and while it does not perfectly 
fit observations, the simplicity of the theory makes it difficult to abandon without severe 
deviations from expectations. The field of BF has grown substantially in recent years, and while 
some aspects of financial markets are better explained by BF, there is yet to be an agreed, all-
encompassing theory to replace the EMH. 
 
Psychological biases of market participants are not a new concept, but the inclusion of 
individualism as a cultural bias in financial literature is. Individualism defines the manner in 
which a person may relate to other persons within an environment and can affect decisions made. 
Individualism can also cause overconfidence in a culture, which in turn can result in excess 
market volatility. 
 
While differential industry specific volatility has been studied extensively from a non-
behavioural perspective, little work has been conducted on behavioural factors affecting it. One 
of the behavioural factors considered here is the effect of individualism through overconfidence 
– however, the results could be extended to infer that behavioural factors have different levels of 
impact on different industries. 
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3. THEORETICAL MOTIVATIONS FOR THE EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
ARCH/GARCH effects present in the time-series volatility data are removed by implementing a 
simple GARCH process, the residuals of which are then used in tests of the hypotheses using 
panel data regression. Several statistical tests are used to determine the appropriate models as 
well as the appropriateness of the data for the given methodology. Both GARCH models and 
panel regressions are standard statistical tests which are used in the field of finance regularly. 
 
3.1 LINEAR REGRESSION 
 
The generalised specification of a multiple linear regression is given here: 
 
                          (1) 
 
where   is the dependent variable;   is the equation intercept, which is fixed in time;    is the 
coefficient of the regressor,   , which in turn is the value of an independent variable (variable  ) 
upon which   is being modeled; and    is the error term which captures any noise causing the 
relationship of   and    to deviate from a linear equation. The error term is also variable through 
time and therefore creates a data series itself that represents how the relationship has deviated 
from linearity through time.    measures the strength of the effect that the independent variable 
   has on the dependent variable  . 
 
Chu, Titman and Wei (2010) model the following specification of the above equation: 
 
                                                            
                                 
(2) 
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including variables for Individualism (    ), prevalence of insider trading (       ), the ratio of 
total private credit to GDP (      ), the volatility of real GDP growth between 1988 and 2003 
(       ), exchange rate volatility (     ), openness of the capital market (    ), the 
country’s debt ratio (    ), and the market capitalisation (    ) where the subscripts   and   
represent the country and time respectively. In this case, the dependent variable,      , is the 
natural log of the volatility of the market. While these variables are important in the study of 
individualism on an entire market, when considering industries within a market, many of these 
effects will be irrelevant. 
 
3.2 PANEL DATA REGRESSION 
 
Panel data is described as having both cross-sectional and time-series components. In 
mathematical terms the data takes the form: 
 
                      (3) 
 
where   is a specific observation,   is a cross-sectional unit (test subject) and   is a unit of time. 
In other words, panel data occurs when observations are taken from multiple subjects at multiple 
points in time. Due to the inclusion of multiple cross-sections, the specification for a panel data 
regression has a double subscript. A generalised equation is given by: 
 
                   (4) 
 
where again   is a cross-sectional unit,   is a unit in time,   is the dependent variable for cross-
section   and time  ,   is the coefficient of the variable, which is represented by  ,      is the 
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value of the variable represented by   in the cross-section   and time   and     captures the 
disturbances (Baltagi, 2005). It should be noted that     contains both a cross-sectional specific, 
time-invariant disturbance, as well as cross-sectional and time-variant disturbance and can be 
modelled as such, giving: 
 
             (5) 
 
where    is the individual specific variance and     is the cross-sectional and time-variant 
disturbance. 
 
Panel data regression has been used frequently in the areas of finance and investment, going back 
as far as Kuh (1959) who states that analytical advantages can be achieved by modelling both 
time series and cross-sectional estimates simultaneously. 
 
3.2.1 FIXED EFFECTS VERSUS RANDOM EFFECTS 
 
The Fixed Effects model of panel data regression is particularly useful when focusing on a 
specific set of cross-sections. The model assumes that    is a static value to be modelled, while 
    is stochastic being independently and identically distributed (Baltagi, 2005). Furthermore     
is assumed to be independent of     for all values of   and  . 
 
The Random Effects model assumes that both    and     are stochastic in nature and are both 
independently and identically distributed. In this case both    and     are independent of each 
other and both are independent of    . The Random Effects model is generally used when 
drawing individuals randomly from a population (Baltagi, 2005). 
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3.3 ARCH/GARCH MODELS 
 
It is possible that the data series being modelled displays volatility clustering (periods of higher 
or lower volatility) and in fact this is quite common in financial data series. Since deviations 
from linearity are captured by the error term in the model specification this would cause error 
terms in the model to be quantifiably larger or smaller based on the value of the error term from 
the previous period. In order to account for this ARCH, models contain the previous   values of 
the error term where   is the calculated number of lags of the error term needed in order to fully 
capture the moving average nature of the error variance. 
 
ARCH models were first explained by Engle (1982) and have been found to be very powerful in 
predicting and explaining innovations in time series’ such as financial data. Engle (1982) 
suggested many reasons for the need of ARCH models, including the observation by McNees 
(1979) that the difficulty in accurately portraying randomness changes through time. Engle 
(1982) also notes that when the mean is modelled using a standard regression, the variance is 
automatically assumed to be constant. 
 
ARCH models have been found to be very effective in modelling several economic phenomena 
such as inflation. Engle (1982) applies a GARCH model to inflation in Britain. Results showed 
highly significant ARCH effects and the applied ARCH model was found to be far more accurate 
in predicting inflationary dynamics than an unrestricted regression. Engle (1983) makes the point 
that the majority of the welfare loss related to inflation is due to the lack of predictability of 
inflation. He goes on to apply an ARCH model to US inflation time series data, finding greater 
predictability than moving variances, rolling regressions and other measures. ARCH models 
were even able to predict inflation in the high inflation volatility period during the seventies. 
 
Engle, Lilien and Robins (1987) extend the ARCH specification of Engle (1982) by allowing the 
mean of the model to be determined by the conditional volatility as opposed to the conditional 
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volatility only affecting future conditional volatility. The extension – called the ARCH-in-Mean 
(ARCH-M) – is applied to interest rate data and is found to predict the term structure of interest 
rates with great accuracy. 
 
Domowitz and Hakkio (1985) apply an ARCH model to the market forecast errors of several 
currencies in an attempt to identify risk premia. They find ARCH effects in some but not all of 
the currencies and the results indicate the existence of a risk premium for the United Kingdom 
and Japan but not Germany, France or Switzerland. An ARMA model including ARCH errors is 
specified by Weiss (1984) in tests of 16 different economic time series’. In some, but not all, of 
these series’ the conditional variance of the errors was well explained using ARCH effects, 
indicating that the series variance was influenced by past variance. However, Weiss (1984) notes 
that the ARCH model on occasion acts as an alternative to log transformations of the data. 
 
A GARCH model introduces a lag of the error variance itself to the specification of the error 
variance. This is appropriate when the error variance follows an autoregressive process as well as 
a moving average process. The GARCH model was introduced by Bollerslev (1986) in an 
attempt to create a more flexible ARCH model. As Bollerslev (1986) notes, the ARCH model 
typically imposes a fixed lag structure in order to avoid problems with negative variance 
parameter estimates. By allowing a lagged conditional variance parameter in the specification of 
the conditional variance, Bollerslev (1986) asserts that a longer memory is allowed and the lag 
structure becomes more flexible.  
 
3.4 SUMMARY 
 
The methodologies used are common among the study of financial time-series as well as 
volatility modelling: ARCH/GARCH models being used extensively in volatility modelling to 
account for volatility clustering and panel regression models being used to determine both cross-
sectional and time-series effects simultaneously. However there are several minor deviations 
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from these standard procedures which have to be considered. To that end, the data will have to 
be tested to determine the correct specification of each methodology to use.  
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4. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
The data and methodology approach was separated into five different steps, which included data 
analysis, data collection, pre-processing and model estimation. The data analysis phase involved 
determining which countries and industries should be included in the analysis by considering the 
available data. Once the applicable sample was decided on the process of collecting the data was 
undertaken as described in the data collection section. Pre-processing, which involved cleaning 
the data as well as forming portfolios, was conducted once the data was available. Model 
estimation is the application of the models against the data and is split further into GARCH 
model estimation and panel data regression model estimation due to the use of both models in the 
statistical analysis. 
 
4.1 DATA PRE-ANALYSIS 
 
The sample period ranged from January 1995 to December 2015, spanning a total of 21 years. 
However, there were cases where an industry had not existed in a country for the entire period, in 
which case the sample was simply reduced for that series. In determining which countries should 
be included the independent variable – the Hofstede (2001) Individualism Index – was examined. 
It was decided that two countries with a high individualism index and two with a low 
individualism index should be included. A fifth country with an index value between the other 
two groups (between 55 and 65), was also included. This results in a data set of five countries 
including the United States of America (high), the United Kingdom (high), China (low), Taiwan 
(low) and South Africa (middle). The individualism indexes in order of highest to lowest, as well 
as the market used to represent the country, are given in table 1 below. 
 
 
 
 29 
 
Table 1 - Country, Representative Market and Individualism index in descending order of individualism 
Country Market Index Value 
The United States of America New York Stock Exchange 91 
The United Kingdom London Stock Exchange 89 
The Republic of South Africa Johannesburg Securities Exchange 65 
China Shanghai Stock Exchange 20 
Taiwan Taiwan Stock Exchange 17 
 
Industry selection was slightly more difficult in that it was a more subjective decision. The 
selected industries should represent areas which could hypothetically be more affected by 
behavioural biases and those which could be less affected. It was assumed that industries with 
less physical assets and more intangible assets would be more affected by behavioural biases 
since the valuation of such a company is more subjective. To that end, the pharmaceuticals and 
biotechnology industry was included since companies in this industry have large numbers of 
patents and other intellectual property which is a large source of income for the company. The 
same can be said for the software and computer services industry. Industries with more easily 
valuable assets should be less affected by behavioural biases such as banks, mining and oil & gas 
producers’ industries, since a large portion of their assets are valued on easily accessible markets. 
However, since the assets in question have volatility in and of themselves, industry level 
volatility will have to be corrected for the volatility of the underlying assets. Lastly the mobile 
telecommunications industry is included since the companies in this industry have large amounts 
of tangible assets, which, while less easy to value, are also less volatile in value. The difference 
between the three types of industries can be seen in figures 1-3 below which plot volatility – not 
returns – on the Y-axis.1 
 
                                                 
1
 The total industry volatility (across all countries) for the figures which follow was calculated by creating a total 
industry (across all 5 countries) portfolio with the use of a market weighted share price for each industry and 
calculating the monthly standard deviation. 
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Figure 1-Volatility of the Software and Computer Services industry across all 5 countries between 1995 and 2015 
 
Figure 2-Volatility of the Banks industry across all 5 countries between 1995 and 2015 
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Figure 3-Volatility of the Mobile Telecommunications industry across all 5 countries between 1995 and 2015 
 
The sample period was selected to limit the effect of any tumultuous market periods which may 
affect industries differently. For instance, the software and computer services industry is 
expected to be more volatile during the Dotcom bubble of 2000 while the banks industry should 
be more volatile during the 2007 Financial Crisis. This is evident in figures 4 and 5 below. 
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Figure 4 - Volatility of the Software and Computer Services industry over the period 1999 - 2003 indicating the Dotcom Bubble 
 
Figure 5-Volatility of the Banks industry over the period 1999 - 2003 indicating the Dotcom Bubble 
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It can plainly be seen that the software and computer services industry was more volatile over the 
period. When looking at the same two industries over the period 2007 – 2010, one can also 
clearly note that the banks industry is more volatile (note that the scales are different). 
 
 
Figure 6-Volatility of the Software and Computer Services industry over the period 2007 - 2010 indicating the Subprime 
Mortgage Crisis 
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Figure 7-Volatility of the Banks industry over the period 2007 - 2010 indicating the Subprime Mortgage Crisis 
 
Other variables to be included in the regression analysis are global volatility, volatility of spot 
gold prices and spot oil prices in order to account for volatility occurring due to factors other 
than individualism. 
 
4.2 DATA COLLECTION 
 
This section focuses on the sourcing of the data which is partially specified above. The first 
obstacle in collecting the correct data was determining the most accurate manner of representing 
an industry. At first industry index returns were collected, however some of the markets did not 
maintain industry indexes and of those that did there were on occasion entire industries missing. 
Further, none of the markets maintained a market cap for industry indexes since it is merely an 
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.005
.010
.015
.020
.025
.030
.035
.040
.045
I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV
2007 2008 2009 2010
BANKS_VOL
 35 
 
of these securities and aggregate them to the industry level. To that end the EQS function of 
Bloomberg Terminal was used to determine which shares were allocated to each of the six 
industries in each of the five markets. This analysis was done by using the ICB industry 
classification for each of the companies. The result was a total of 2000 securities for which the 
information was collected. 
 
The information which was required included the closing share price at a daily frequency, the 
market capitalisation on a daily basis and the daily trade volume – dividend information was not 
included. Once the required data was collected the market industry portfolios could be created. 
Firstly, each of the shares was conformed to a single date set. This was generally different 
between each market due to the existence of differing exchange holidays and trading rules. 
However, within a market it was required that all securities conform to a single date set. This 
was achieved by removing dates where data was missing or inserting data where required. 
Inserted data was either an extension of the data from previous trade dates or future trade dates 
and never included share prices. For example, where a market capitalisation or trading volume 
was missing for a share the market capitalisation or trading volume from the previous day (or 
following day depending on data availability) was inserted. However, where a shares price was 
missing for several shares, then that date would be excluded from the set. Since the market 
capitalisation was used merely for industry portfolio construction, minor differences between the 
data and reality had little consequence. 
 
Once the data was conformed industry portfolios were constructed by summing the market 
capitalisations of all the securities within the industry for a given date and then dividing the 
security specific market capitalisation of each security by this cumulative market capitalisation to 
give a portfolio weight to each security. The equation is given here: 
 
    
   
   
⁄   (6) 
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where    is the portfolio weight of the specific security,     and     are the market 
capitalisation of the security and the portfolio respectively. 
 
Once the portfolio weights were determined, the portfolio price could be calculated by summing 
the products of the individual security prices and weights as below. 
 
 
   ∑     
 
   
  (7) 
 
where    is the industry portfolio price,    is the individual share price and   is the number of 
shares in an industry. 
 
Industry trade volume was created simply by summing the trade volumes of each of the 
constituent shares. A monthly industry volatility was created by taking the standard deviation of 
all of the industry log returns (calculated as    
  
    
⁄  ) for each calendar month during the 
period, resulting in 252 observations per market industry portfolio of which there were 29 (since 
there is no mining industry in Taiwan). This gives a total of 7308 observations across the entire 
sample for each of industry volatility, market capitalisation and trade volume. This industry 
volatility becomes the dependent variable of all of the specifications, which aligns with the 
specifications used by Chui, Titman and Wei (2010). 
 
4.3 PRE-PROCESSING 
 
Before statistical models could be applied to the data, the distributions of the data must be 
analysed and transformations applied where necessary. The distributional factors which are 
investigated include the normality, independence and stationarity of the volatility series. These 
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tests need to be carried out on each of the 29 series; however, since the GARCH model will be 
run on the industries as a whole and not on individual series’, several panel unit root tests will 
also be carried out to test for stationarity across the entire industry. The panel unit root tests 
include the Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) and the Breitung (2000) unit root tests which test for a 
common unit root across cross-sections and the Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003), Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests which test for individual unit roots within cross-sections. 
 
4.3.1 NORMALITY 
 
While GARCH modelling techniques can estimate a model using different distributions, in order 
to accurately apply a GARCH model to a data set the data set should be distributed similarly to 
the normal distribution. In order to determine the normality of the data set, a frequency 
distribution histogram is examined as well as descriptive statistics and the results of the Jarque-
Bera test for normality. Below is a sample of the histogram and descriptive data analysis from 
the JSE banks industry. 
 
 
Figure 8-Frequency Distribution Histogram and Descriptive Statistics of the Banks industry on the JSE 
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As can be seen from figure 8 above, the volatility is far right skewed and the Jarque-Bera test for 
normality results in a value of 30486.16 and a p-value of 0, rejecting the null hypothesis that the 
series is normally distributed. In order to rectify the data, the same methodology of Christiansen, 
Schmeling and Schrimpf (2012) is applied, whereby a log transformation is used on the volatility 
data. The results as can be seen below, greatly improve the distribution of the data. 
 
 
Figure 9-Frequency Distribution Histogram and Descriptive Statistics of the Banks industry on the JSE after Log Transformation 
 
The p-value of the Jarque-Bera test is now 0.093035, which does still reject the null hypothesis 
of normality at the 10% level but cannot reject the null hypothesis of normality at the 1% or 5% 
levels. 
 
4.3.2 INDEPENDENCE 
 
In order to test for independence, the correlogram of each of the series’ was examined. An 
independently distributed time series is one in which an observation of the time series is not 
related to any of the observations before. This should be indicated by little to no autocorrelation. 
As can be seen in figure 10 below the autocorrelation only dissipates between the 20
th
 and 23
rd
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lag. However, the partial correlation which controls for all values of the time series at shorter 
lags drops off after the 3
rd
 lag. While these are not great results we cannot reject the idea of 
independence based on this. 
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Figure 10-Correlogram of the Log transformed volatility of the Banks industry on the JSE 
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4.3.3 STATIONARITY 
 
Stationarity refers to the premise that the mean, variance and autocorrelation structure do not 
change over time. A simple manner to determine this is by looking at a line graph of the time 
series and examining the mean and variance of the series, which is done below for the JSE banks 
industry. Tests for stationarity test either for a unit root in the data or for stationarity itself. Three 
stationarity tests including the Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test, the Phillips-Perron unit 
root test and the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin stationarity test are employed. 
 
 
Figure 11 - Line graph of the Log transformed volatility of the Banks industry on the JSE 
 
As can be seen from figure 11 above, both the mean and variance appear to change over time. 
However, it is still possible that the series is statistically stationary. In table 2 below are the 
formal stationarity test results, again for the JSE banks industry. 
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Table 2-Unit root test results for the Banks industry of the JSE 
Test Test Statistic 1% Critical Value 5% Critical Value 10% Critical Value 
ADF -5.026986 -4.008706 -3.434433 -3.141157 
PP -7.318497 -4.008706 -3.434433 -3.141157 
KPSS 0.106217 0.216000 0.146000 0.119000 
 
 
The null hypothesis of both the Augmented Dickey-Fuller and the Phillips-Perron tests is that the 
data series contains a unit root. As can be seen in both of the first two rows above, the null 
hypothesis can be rejected at the 1% level since the test statistics of both tests are larger than the 
1% critical values, with p-values of 0.0003 and 0 for the Augmented Dickey-Fuller and the 
Phillips-Perron respectively. Thus it can be determined that the data series does not have a unit 
root. The Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin tests the null hypothesis that the series is 
stationary. Therefore if the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test statistic is larger than the 
asymptotic critical values calculated by the test then the null hypothesis of stationarity can be 
rejected and it can be concluded that the series is non-stationary. However, it can be seen in the 
above results that the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test statistic is below the asymptotic 
critical values at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level and therefore the null hypothesis of 
stationarity cannot be rejected. It is found that many of the series’ are non-stationary; however 
since the series’ are modelled together, it is the stationarity of the industries as a whole – across 
the different markets – which is important. 
 
Panel data was created by using the market as the cross-section indicator variable. A summary of 
unit root results was obtained from EViews 9, the null hypothesis of all tests being that a unit 
root exists in the data, either individually or commonly across cross-sections. An example of the 
results is included below. 
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Table 3 - Summary of Panel Unit Root test results for the Banks industry 
 
 
Table 3 above illustrates that all p-values for tests of unit roots are essentially 0, allowing us to 
reject the null hypothesis that the series contains a unit root. According to these results, the data 
series’ are stationary and therefore a GARCH model can be applied. 
 
4.4 MODEL ESTIMATION 
 
The data is modelled in 2 phases – GARCH model estimation and Linear Regression estimation. 
The purpose of the GARCH model is to remove conditional heteroscedasticity from the series’. 
The resulting residuals are then used as the dependent variable in the Linear Regression 
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estimation. This should result in a more accurate description of the relationship between 
volatility and individualism since a large proportion of the time varying nature of volatility 
should be removed through the application of a GARCH model, aligning with the (time 
invariable) individualism index better. 
 
The returns of each of the series are calculated as the natural logarithm of the current observation 
divided by the previous observation or, specified mathematically as: 
 
   (
  
    
⁄ )  (8) 
 
where    and      are the share price at time   and     respectively. Volatility of industry 
returns are calculated as  
 
 
     
∑           ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
   
   
  
  
(9) 
 
where      is the standard deviation of returns of industry   in country   in month  ,    is the 
number of days within month ,      is the return for industry   in country   at time   and     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , 
which represents the average return for industry   in country   in month  , is calculated as 
    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
∑     
 
   
 
.  
 
4.4.1 GARCH MODEL ESTIMATION 
 
A GARCH (1, 1) model is applied after consideration of the Akaike Information Criterion of 
several different specifications.  The GARCH (1, 1) model is also widely considered to contain a 
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sufficient number of lags of both the conditional variance and residuals for most time series data. 
The GARCH model specification is given below. 
 
 
     ∑      
 
 
   
 ∑       
 
   
  (10) 
 
where    is the regression coefficient of the squared lagged residual at time     (in this case 
   ),    is the regression coefficient of the lagged conditional volatility at time   (also   ) 
and     is the conditional variance of the error term,  , and    is modeled as 
 
       √    (11) 
 
where    is white noise and the variance of such is equal to 1. This model is run on all volatility 
series’ since they show signs of heteroscedasticity. Several of the other regressors – namely the 
volatility of the MSCI World Index, spot gold price and spot oil price – are also modelled using 
GARCH effects due to their frequency distributions. A Normal distribution is assumed for the 
GARCH model since almost all of the time series’ examined earlier were considered to be 
normally distributed through statistical analysis. No other changes were made to the standard 
GARCH specification on EViews. An example of the output of one of the GARCH models is 
given below: 
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Table 4 - GARCH Model results for the Banks industry of the JSE 
 
 
As can be seen from table 4 the model itself is not particularly powerful, with a negative R-
Squared. It should be taken into account that the R-Squared value is a test of the mean equation 
whereas a GARCH model is a specification of the conditional volatility; therefore the R-Squared 
is not particularly important in determining goodness of fit. However, the intercept variable and 
the lagged conditional variance variable are both statistically significant at the 1% level and the 
lagged squared residual variable is significant at the 5% level. In order to test the efficacy of the 
GARCH analysis in removing GARCH effects the squared residuals were examined, specifically 
the correlogram of the squared residuals. Upon examination, any autocorrelation had been 
removed from the series. These residuals were then used in the regression analysis. 
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4.4.2 PANEL DATA REGRESSION 
 
The residuals of the GARCH models were used in a panel data regression against several 
different independent variables which are discussed below. The data was organised into six 
different panel data sets, one for each industry, the cross-sectional variable being the market 
which the series represents. The data sets included the industry volatility residuals as the 
dependent variable, the individualism index for each country, the GARCH residuals of the MSCI 
World Index and the total market capitalisation of the market-industry series. Other regressors 
were also applied where necessary meaning that the specification was not the same for all series’. 
For example, the oil & gas producers sector was modelled against the spot oil price. The 
specifications are given below: 
 
Banks, Mobile Telecommunications, Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology and Software & 
Computer Services: 
 
                                   (12) 
 
where      is the residual of the natural log of volatility of industry   in country   in month , 
     is country  ’s individualism index,      is the market capitalisation of country   in 
month  ,     is the residual volatility of the MSCI World index in month  ,        is the 
volatility of industry   in country   in the previous month (     and    is the error term for 
month . 
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Oil & Gas Producers: 
 
                                       (13) 
 
The specification for the oil & gas producers’ industry is the same as the others except for the 
inclusion of    , which represents the residual volatility of the spot oil price in month  . The 
volatility of the spot oil price is expected to have an effect on the volatility of oil & gas 
producers since that is the primary means of income for the majority of the constituent 
companies of the oil & gas producers industry. 
 
Mining: 
 
                                       (14) 
 
Again, the mining industry only includes the residual volatility of the spot gold price in month  
– represented by     – as an extra independent variable. The volatility of the spot gold price is 
again included as it is expected to have a strong effect on the volatility of the mining industry as 
a whole. 
 
A panel linear regression was used to estimate the different models, using the Least Squares 
methodology. A Fixed Effects model was initially specified in order to account for unobserved 
effects caused by variables which are correlated with the covariates. However, this specification 
resulted in a near singular matrix on all occasions, possibly due to the small number of 
covariates. A Random Effects model was also considered to account for possible exogenous 
variables which have no effect on the covariates, which is quite possible in this arena. In order to 
test if Random Effects models are appropriate, the Hausman Test is conducted on the model 
output. The Hausman test tests the null hypothesis that Random Effects are consistent with the 
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data. If this is the case then Random Effects should be included in the model since they are 
consistent and efficient, whereas Fixed effects are inefficient. However, if the null hypothesis is 
rejected then Random Effects should not be applied to the data. In order to conduct the Hausman 
test the Random Effects model must first be estimated. Unfortunately, in order to use the 
Random Effects methodology, the number of cross-sections must be larger than the number of 
independent variables. This was not the case for the mining industry since there were only 4 
cross-sections and 4 regressors. An example of the Hausman test results is given below. 
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Table 5 - Hasuman Test results for the Banks panel Regression 
 
 
As can be seen from table 5 above the p-value of the Hausman test is equal to 0, allowing us to 
reject the null hypothesis of the consistency of Random Effects with the data. Fixed Effects were 
out of the question for this model due to the existence of a variable which does not vary over 
time – the Individualism Index – and a variable which does not vary between cross-sections – the 
residuals of the returns to the MSCI World Index. The Hofstede (2001) Individualism Index was 
only ever created once, resulting in a time-invariant variable. The reason for this is the intense 
effort that went into collecting and analysing the results of the surveys which were used to 
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conduct the study and produce the index. Therefore, no effects are used when specifying the 
regression models. 
 
In order to test that the regressors were correctly specified an analysis of the actual versus fitted 
residuals is undertaken. If regressors are correctly specified, the actual versus fitted residuals plot 
should be uniformly or linearly distributed. For example, if a regressor requires a square root 
transformation the residuals will display a cone shape. An example of the actual versus fitted 
residuals graph is given below. In this case the JSE market has been modelled alone to avoid 
contamination from the other market series’. 
 
 
Figure 12 - Actual verses Fitted Residuals plot for the Banks industry of the JSE 
 
As can be seen from the residual diagram, figure 12, above, the fitted residuals generally plot in a 
linear fashion against the actual residuals around the x-axis. The above graph does not tell us 
enough about the result to make any conclusions of the goodness of fit of the model. 
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A last test of goodness of fit is to test the correlogram of the residuals for autocorrelation. Below 
is an example of the correlogram of the residuals of the banks industry using Least Squares 
regression with no effects, weighting or coefficient covariance methods. 
 
 
Figure 13 - Correlogram of Residuals of Bank inudstry Panel Regression with no transformation 
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As can be seen from figure 13 above, the residuals are highly correlated through time with a p-
value for the Q-statistic being 0 for all lags. In an attempt to combat this both the White method 
and the Panel Corrected Standard Error methodologies were used, which both compute standard 
errors which are robust in the presence of within cross- section heteroscedasticity and serial 
correlation. Unfortunately, neither of these methodologies has any effect on the autocorrelation 
of the residuals. 
 
Lastly a lagged dependent variable was introduced in a final attempt to mitigate autocorrelation 
of residuals. The results are given below. 
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Figure 14 - Correlogram of Residuals of Bank industry Panel Regression with lagged dependent variable 
 
As can be seen from figure 14 above, the introduction of a lagged dependent variable has 
certainly improved the autocorrelation of the residuals when looking at the box diagram, 
however the p-value of the Q-statistic is still statistically significant at all lags. 
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Unfortunately, as can be seen from table 6 below, the analysis does suffer from cross-sectional 
dependence with p-values of 0 for the Breusch-Pagan LM, Pesaran scaled LM and Pesaran CD 
tests. This is to be expected since market volatility is not independent of the volatility of other 
markets. However, this may have negative impacts on the accuracy of the analysis. 
 
Table 6 - Residual Cross-Section Dependence test results for Banks industry Panel Regression 
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5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
5.1 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
The results of the analysis are by no means uniform across industries, which was expected. 
However, this does not mean that the results were not surprising. A review of the statistical 
results is given here before the implications and possible explanations are considered in the 
discussion.  
 
5.1.1 BANKS 
 
The first observation to make regarding the results in table 7 below are with respect to the R-
Squared and Adjusted R-Squared values.  The R-Squared value gives the squared multiple 
correlation coefficient and represents the proportion of variation of the data that is explained 
through the regression equation. The Adjusted R-Squared value reflects the number of data 
points and variables in the equation in order to scale the R-Squared value. If an added variable 
does not contribute significantly to the model fit, the adjusted R-Squared may decrease while the 
R-Squared may increase. In this case, the R-Squared and Adjusted R-Squared are both above 
0.54 or 54%. The similarity between the two shows that the equation does not include redundant 
variables. In general while this may seem low, it is a reasonable fit for a model of return 
volatility. 
 
Each of the variables in the given equation are statistically significant at all levels of significance 
with p-values below 0.01 meaning that we can reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient is 
equal to 0 for all variables. The intercept is the least significant of the variables with a p-value of 
0.0035 but has the largest coefficient. This indicates that the natural logarithm of the bank 
industry’s standard volatility is 0.85 or that the bank industry’s normal return standard deviation 
is 2.33 (     ) when the effects of the other coefficients are negated. 
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Market capitalisation is the next weakest variable with a p-value of 0.0011 and interestingly has 
a negative coefficient of -0.034375. This signifies that the higher the market capitalisation, the 
lower the volatility for the banks industry. This is in line with the findings of Campbell, Lettau, 
Malkiel and Xu (2001) that show that larger industries have less volatility. 
 
The lagged natural logarithm of the industry volatility variable is the most powerful with a t-
statistic of 21.00381 and a relatively large coefficient of 0.488124 showing that the volatility of 
the previous month has a very high impact on the current period volatility. In fact if the natural 
logarithm of the previous month’s volatility was 1 then the natural logarithm of the current 
month’s volatility would be 0.488 higher than usual. Since both variables are log transformed the 
interpretability of the coefficients is slightly different to a regression with untransformed 
variables. In this case a 1% increase in the lagged banks industry volatility results in a 0.488% 
increase in the current banks volatility. 
 
The MSCI World Index is also very powerful with a t-statistic of 14.56927 and a coefficient of 
0.371184. The reason that the coefficient of this variable is not higher is probably due to the 
diversification effect of including many very different countries in the sample. 
 
Lastly, the individualism index has a t-statistic of 4.272446 showing that it is highly statistically 
significant, however the coefficient is only 0.001505. The interpretation of this result is slightly 
different from the others since the individualism index is not log transformed. In this case the 
coefficient of 0.001505 indicates a 0.15% change in the dependent variable for a one-unit change 
in the individualism Index. This is both a statistically and economically significant result. 
 
 
 58 
 
Table 7 - Panel Regression results for Banks industry 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic p-Value 
Intercept*** 0.845741 2.922999 0.0035 
Individualism Index*** 0.001505 4.272446 0.0000 
Market Capitalisation*** -0.034375 -3.266716 0.0011 
MSCI World Index*** 0.371184 14.56927 0.0000 
Lagged Dependent Variable*** 0.488124 21.00381 0.0000 
R-Squared 0.544414   
Adjusted R-Squared 0.542876   
* = significant at the 10% level, ** = significant at the 5% level and *** = significant at the 1% level 
 
5.1.2 MINING 
 
Except for the inclusion of the volatility of the gold price, the same model specification was 
given for the mining industry. 
 
The results in table 8 are vastly different to that of the banks industry. The R-Squared and 
Adjusted R-Squared values are much lower, indicating that only 41% of the dependent variables 
volatility is explained by the regression line. This indicates that there are possible omitted 
variables. The power of the intercept is larger in this case with a coefficient of 1.073117 and a t-
statistic of 4.645948. 
 
The MSCI World Index is far less significant both statistically and economically with a t-statistic 
of 5.747927 and a coefficient of 0.179804, the introduction of the spot gold price as an 
independent variable possibly detracting from the power of the MSCI World Index. The 
volatility of the gold spot price achieved a t-statistic of 5.184368 and a coefficient of 0.169005 
showing that a 1% change in the volatility of the gold price results in a 0.169% increase in the 
volatility of the mining industry. 
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Again the lagged natural logarithm of the volatility of the mining industry is the strongest 
predictor with a t-statistic of 19.10338 and a coefficient of 0.498169 signifying that almost 50% 
of the volatility of the mining industry in the current period is explainable from the previous 
period’s volatility. 
 
Market capitalisation has a relatively similar effect with a coefficient of -0.042197 and a t-
statistic of -4.706227, therefore a 1% change in market capitalisation causes a -0.042% change in 
volatility – again in line with the results of Cambell, Lettau, Malkiel and Xu (2001). The biggest 
difference however, is the insignificance of the individualism index with a p-value of 0.4329; 
making it impossible to reject the null hypothesis that the effect of the individualism index is 
equal to 0. 
 
Table 8 - Panel Regression results for the Mining industry 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic p-Value 
Intercept*** 1.073117 4.645948 0.0000 
Individualism Index -0.000349 -0.784561 0.4329 
Market Capitalisation*** -0.042197 -4.706227 0.0000 
Spot Gold*** 0.169005 5.184368 0.0000 
MSCI World Index*** 0.179804 5.747927 0.0000 
Lagged Dependent Variable*** 0.498169 19.10338 0.0000 
R-Squared 0.409612   
Adjusted R-Squared 0.406655   
* = significant at the 10% level, ** = significant at the 5% level and *** = significant at the 1% level 
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5.1.3 OIL & GAS PRODUCERS 
 
For the oil & gas producers industry the gold spot price volatility was replaced with the oil spot 
price volatility. The specification besides this was the same as the other industries due to similar 
results of the tests conducted above. 
 
The R-Squared and Adjusted R-Squared for the oil & gas producers’ industry is very low with 
values of 0.369585 and 0.366210 respectively. These are low values and indicate that the model 
does not fit the data particularly well but again is still respectable for a series of this nature. 
 
Both the intercept and market capitalisation are insignificant at the 1% and 5% levels of 
significance, showing vast differences in the structure of the volatility from the other industries 
tested so far. The market capitalisation result, with a coefficient of -0.009030, still conforms with 
the assumption that larger industries have less volatility. The intercept coefficient of 0.202057 
indicates that the oil & gas producers industry has less intrinsic volatility than the others so far. 
 
The volatility of the spot oil price is the next weakest variable with a p-value of 0.0029; 
however, this is statistically significant at all levels. The coefficient of 0.101423 indicates a 
weaker effect than that of the gold spot price on the mining industry. However, the MSCI World 
Index has a very similar effect to that of the mining industry with a t-statistic of 6.011385 and a 
coefficient of 0.179415. 
 
The lagged natural logarithm of the oil & gas producers industry volatility is still the best 
predictor of current volatility with a t-statistic of 16.82534 and a coefficient of 0.466331 and the 
individualism index is again insignificant at all levels with a p-value of 0.2663. 
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Table 9 - Panel Regression results for the Oil & Gas Producers industry 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic p-Value 
Intercept* 0.202057 1.733483 0.0833 
Individualism Index 0.000425 1.112266 0.2663 
Market Capitalisation* -0.009030 -1.926771 0.0543 
Spot Oil*** 0.101423 2.987092 0.0029 
MSCI World Index*** 0.179415 6.011385 0.0000 
Lagged Dependent Variable*** 0.466331 16.82534 0.0000 
R-Squared 0.369585   
Adjusted R-Squared 0.366210   
* = significant at the 10% level, ** = significant at the 5% level and *** = significant at the 1% level 
 
5.1.4 PHARMACEUTICALS & BIOTECHNOLOGY 
 
The specification for the pharmaceuticals & biotechnology industry was the same as that of the 
banks industry with no additional regressors. 
 
The results for the pharmaceuticals and biotechnology industry are interesting and different from 
the results of the industries which came before. The R-Squared and Adjusted R-Squared are 
0.461845 and 0.460106 respectively, indicating a relatively good fit of the model for a market 
volatility specification. 
 
The intercept and market capitalisation variables are both significant only at the 10% level of 
significance, and both have the opposite sign to any of the results of the previous industries. The 
intercept with a coefficient of -0.246073 is not difficult to understand because when correcting 
for the log transformation the result becomes 0.358. However, this is the lowest value that has 
been recorded thus far and indicates that the pharmaceuticals & biotechnology industry has the 
lowest industry specific volatility. The market capitalisation coefficient of 0.009708, while 
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small, is counterintuitive since this indicates that a 1% change in the market capitalisation would 
result in a 0.0097% increase in volatility. 
 
Again the lagged pharmaceutical & biotechnology industry volatility is a strong predictor with a 
coefficient of 0.641355 and a t-statistic of 29.99894 and the MSCI World Index is also very 
strong with a coefficient of 0.122307 and a t-statistic of 5.076766. 
 
The individualism index is significant at the 10% and 5% levels of significance with a p-value of 
0.0495. The coefficient of 0.000695 indicates that a 1% change in the individualism index would 
result in a 0.0695% increase in volatility. While this effect is smaller than that of the effect on the 
banks industry, it points to a similar relationship. 
 
Table 10 - Panel Regression results for the Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology industry 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic p-Value 
Intercept* -0.246073 -1.957287 0.0505 
Individualism Index** 0.000695 1.966423 0.0495 
Market Capitalisation* 0.009708 1.885517 0.0596 
MSCI World Index*** 0.122307 5.076766 0.0000 
Lagged Dependent Variable*** 0.641355 29.99894 0.0000 
R-Squared 0.461845   
Adjusted R-Squared 0.460106   
* = significant at the 10% level, ** = significant at the 5% level and *** = significant at the 1% level 
 
5.1.5 SOFTWARE & COMPUTER SERVICES 
 
The software & computer services results are quite similar to that of the banks industry. The 
specifications are identical since no additional regressors were added to the equation. 
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Again the R-Squared and Adjusted R-Squared are 0.428847 and 0.426937 respectively reflecting 
an acceptable model fit. The results regarding the intercept and market capitalisation are more in 
line with expectations although are both insignificant at the 1% level of significance. The 
intercept with a coefficient of 0.317072 and a p-value of 0.0478 is quite high but still reasonable, 
while the market capitalisation with a p-value of 0.0217 and a coefficient of -0.015345 again 
aligns with the results of Cambell, Lettau, Malkiel and Xu (2001). 
 
The MSCI World index and the lagged dependent variable also both follow expectations with t-
statistics of 6.048918 and 26.47547 respectively and coefficients of 0.159329 and 0.597680 
respectively. 
 
The individualism index is again highly significant at all levels of significance with a p-value of 
0.0061 and the coefficient of 0.001037 aligns with what has come to be expected. The coefficient 
implies that a 1% change in the individualism index would result in a 0.1037% increase in the 
volatility of the software & computer services industry. 
 
Table 11 -Panel Regression results for the Software & Computer Services industry 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic p-Value 
Intercept** 0.317072 1.981502 0.0478 
Individualism Index*** 0.001037 2.745182 0.0061 
Market Capitalisation** -0.015345 -2.298468 0.0217 
MSCI World Index*** 0.159329 6.048918 0.0000 
Lagged Dependent Variable*** 0.597680 26.47547 0.0000 
R-Squared 0.428847   
Adjusted R-Squared 0.426937   
* = significant at the 10% level, ** = significant at the 5% level and *** = significant at the 1% level 
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5.1.6 MOBILE TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
 
The mobile telecommunications industry was subject to the same model specification as that of 
the banks, pharmaceuticals & biotechnology and software & computer services industries with 
no additional regressors. 
 
The mobile telecommunications industry produces results that are similar to that of mining and 
oil & gas producers industries with a significant intercept and market capitalisation variable (p-
values of 0.0042 and 0.0025 respectively), the coefficients of which meet expectations as 
discussed this far. The R-Squared and Adjusted R-squared are slightly low with values of 
0.379641 and 0.377527 respectively, but they are still reasonable. 
 
The lagged mobile telecommunications industry volatility is significant at all levels (with a t-
statistic of 19.83102) and has a reasonable coefficient of 0.484272. The MSCI World index is 
slightly more powerful with a t-statistic of 9.667549 and a coefficient of 0.239354, which may be 
due to the lack of an additional regressor as with the banks industry. 
 
The individualism index is statistically insignificant at all levels with a p-value of 0.3436. 
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Table 12 -Panel Regression results for the Mobile Telecommunications industry 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic p-Value 
Intercept*** 0.542099 2.866768 0.0042 
Individualism Index 0.000352 0.947543 0.3436 
Market Capitalisation*** -0.022172 -3.035804 0.0025 
MSCI World Index*** 0.239354 9.667549 0.0000 
Lagged Dependent Variable*** 0.484272 19.83102 0.0000 
R-Squared 0.379641   
Adjusted R-Squared 0.377527   
* = significant at the 10% level, ** = significant at the 5% level and *** = significant at the 1% level 
 
5.1.7 VOLUME 
 
In order to test all of the hypotheses, similar tests had to be conducted on the volume of the 
representative industries traded on a daily basis. The volume data is also log transformed in an 
attempt to achieve normality. The results for each of the industries are given in table 13 below – 
the coefficients above and the p-values in brackets below. 
 
The below results imply interesting results with the effects almost being opposite to those of the 
results of the tests conducted on the volatility of the industries, especially the results regarding 
the individualism index. However, it is quite possible that these models are misspecified 
considering that the R-Squared and Adjusted R-Squared of the models are suspiciously high, 
ranging from 0.81 to 0.88. 
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Table 13 - Results of Panel Data Regression on trading volume 
Variable Banks Mining Oil & Gas Pharmaceuticals Software Telecoms 
Intercept -0.5753 
(0.3212) 
0.9264** 
(0.0358) 
0.4111 
(0.1354) 
-3.2873*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.6473** 
(0.0432) 
-1.7560*** 
(0.0007) 
Individualism 
-0.0006 
(0.3992) 
-
0.0030*** 
(0.0010) 
0.0022** 
(0.0174) 
-0.0075*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0002 
(0.7516) 
0.0016* 
(0.0982) 
Market 
Capitalisation 
0.1333*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0700*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0583*** 
(0.0000) 
0.3647*** 
(0.0000) 
0.1543*** 
(0.0000) 
0.1703*** 
(0.0000) 
MSCI World 
Index 
0.1065** 
(0.0185) 
-0.0147 
(0.7970) 
-0.0111 
(0.8715) 
-0.0004 
(0.9944) 
-0.0333 
(0.5073) 
0.0137 
(0.8205) 
Lagged Volume 0.8374*** 
(0.0000) 
0.8556*** 
(0.0000) 
0.8831*** 
(0.0000) 
0.6729*** 
(0.0000) 
0.8134*** 
(0.0000) 
0.8408*** 
(0.0000) 
Gold 
- 
0.1109* 
(0.0784) 
- - - - 
Oil 
- - 
0.00003 
(0.9997) 
- - - 
* = significant at the 10% level, ** = significant at the 5% level and *** = significant at the 1% level 
 
5.2 DISCUSSION 
 
The primary objective of this study is to determine the relative effect of certain behavioural 
biases on the volatility of industries with differing structures and characteristics. The concept that 
some industries are easier to value, deriving more income from market-valued assets than others, 
is the cornerstone of the hypothesis. Those industries that draw income from assets which are 
difficult to value (patents, future earnings and growth, as well as others) are more vulnerable to 
behavioural biases in valuations.  
 
Two hypotheses were described at the beginning of the current study, both of which will be 
discussed in this section with reference to the results in the previous section as well as the 
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literature in Chapter 2. The hypotheses are discussed in reverse order due to the level of detail of 
each hypothesis – the secondary hypothesis being the most detailed with the primary hypothesis 
being the most abstract. 
 
5.2.1 SECONDARY HYPOTHESIS 
 
Hypothesis 2 states that the effect of individualism on volatility is driven through 
overconfidence. A direct test of this hypothesis is difficult since no variable representing 
overconfidence is available. However, it is possible to account for the effects of overconfidence 
bias through the analysis of proxy variables and effects based on the work of other researchers. 
 
Odean (1998) and Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) show that volatility is 
increased through overconfident traders. This implies that overconfidence should have a positive 
relationship with industry volatility. In the case of the banks, pharmaceuticals & biotechnology 
and software & computer services industries the individualism index is found to have a 
significant positive relationship with volatility which aligns with the expectations of Odean 
(1998) regarding the effect of overconfidence on volatility. Therefore this result supports the null 
hypothesis that the effect of individualism on industry volatility occurs through the mechanism 
of overconfidence. 
 
Gervais and Odean (2001) prove that investor overconfidence leads to increased trading volume. 
The concept behind this states that if an investor is overconfident in his abilities he will place 
more money behind his abilities, expecting higher returns. This results in higher trade volumes. 
 
The results of the current study don’t support those of Gervais and Odean (2001) since the 
effects of individualism are different on volatility and volume. The results show that for those 
industries where individualism is significant in predicting volatility, individualism is 
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insignificant in predicting volume. And for those industries where individualism isn’t significant 
in predicting volatility, it is significant in predicting volume. This contradicts the expectation that 
individualism should significantly affect both volatility and volume within an industry in order to 
show that the effect of individualism occurs through the existence of overconfidence in the 
market. 
 
It should be noted quite strongly at this stage that the results regarding the effect of individualism 
on the trading volume of each of the industries seem to be counterintuitive when compared to 
those of previous literature (Odean, 1998; Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam, 1998; Gervais 
and Odean, 2001; Chu, Titman and Wei, 2010). With high R-Squared and Adjusted R-Squared 
values and counterintuitive results the validity of the analysis is sceptical at best. Further analysis 
should be conducted to investigate the relationship further. 
 
5.2.2 PRIMARY HYPOTHESIS 
 
The primary hypothesis of the current study states that Individualism has different effects on 
different industries and further; Hypothesis 1.1 states that industries with lower fundamental 
asset to market value ratios – those industries which are more difficult to value fundamentally – 
are more affected by Individualism than those which are easier to value. 
 
It should be noted first that due to the structuring of the data into a panel set where country, 
represented by the different equity markets, is the cross-sectional identifier, we are able to make 
specific conclusions on the effect of the variables between countries. The regression 
specifications test the effect of the different variables on a specific industry across countries. 
Therefore, any kind of significance of any of the variables shows that that variable can be used to 
predict volume and volatility even in different countries and therefore the effect is not 
independent of country. 
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In the current specifications, individualism is shown to be significant as a regressor of volatility 
in the banks, pharmaceuticals & biotechnology and software & computer services industries 
signifying that individualism can be used as a predictor of volatility for those industries within 
each of the separate countries. Because of this result we can infer that individualism has differing 
effects on different regions at least and quite possibly on each of the countries separately. This 
supports the findings of Chui, Titman and Wei (2010) who show that the effect of individualism 
is different for different countries. 
 
The basis of Hypothesis 1 comes from the model of Scheinkman and Xiong (2003), which shows 
that overconfidence causes disparities in the valuations of asset fundamentals, which in turn 
causes an increase in price volatility. This concept is then expanded on further by noting that 
asset fundamentals of certain industries are easier to measure than others, resulting in a reduced 
effect from overconfidence on the price volatility. A further link shows that individualism causes 
overconfidence (Biais et al., 2005; Gelfand et al., 2002; Yates, Lee & Shinotsuka, 1996). 
However, Hypothesis 1 specifically considers the direct relationship between individualism and 
industry volatility and volume. 
 
With regards to the industries themselves, it is expected that the pharmaceuticals & 
biotechnology and software & computer services industries should be strongly affected by 
behavioural biases, specifically individualism and overconfidence, due to the fact that a large 
proportion of the income earned by these companies is due to patents or proprietary information 
– assets which are very difficult to value. The mining and oil & gas industries are much easier to 
value since the products of the industries are valued almost constantly on an open exchange 
market. Banks should be similarly easy to value since the assets they maintain are generally 
exchange traded, deposits from customers or home loans which are easily valued using 
discounted cash flow methods. The mobile telecommunications industry maintains slightly less 
liquid – but no less difficult to value – infrastructure assets. These last four industries should 
have little or no impact from individualism or other behavioural biases. 
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The results almost perfectly align with expectations with respect to the effect of individualism on 
industry volatility. The effect of individualism is strong in both the pharmaceuticals & 
biotechnology and software & computer services industries. The effect is slightly stronger, both 
in terms of magnitude and significance in the software & computer services industry, possibly 
due to the fact that the pharmaceuticals & biotechnology industry may include some physical 
assets which are more easily valuable, while software & computer services is almost entirely 
service based. 
 
The most unexpected result from the analysis is that of the banks industry. The individualism 
effect is strongest – again with respect to both magnitude and significance – on the banks 
industry. This is intriguing since the banks industry should be more uniformly valued as 
discussed before. However, it is quite possible that this relationship is not due to the 
overconfidence, or other behavioural biases of traders and investors in those regions, but rather 
due to the behaviour of employees. 
 
The definition of individualism is the extent to which one considers oneself as a single unit, 
autonomous from others in the environment or as a part of a whole which makes up the 
environment. In a collectivistic culture it is very likely that employees of banks show more 
restraint in terms of risk taking activities since they are custodians of the money of their 
communal members. While in individualistic cultures bank employees may consider this fact 
less important and take on more risk. These excessive risk-taking activities would be reflected in 
bank security prices, causing more volatility in those cultures. The extreme example is that of the 
financial crisis of 2007/2008 which was precipitated in the United States of America – the most 
individualistic culture in the current study. 
 
An alternate explanation is the consideration that the sample period includes the financial crisis 
of 2007/2008 and that the two individualistic cultures – the United States of America and the 
United Kingdom – were the most severely affected by the crisis, thus creating a spurious result. 
It follows that the volatility of the banks industry in both the United States and the United 
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Kingdom would be higher than in other countries over this period. However, given that the 
sample period stretches over 20 years and the financial crisis only occurred during a short part of 
this sample, this effect should be diluted. The fact that the p-value of the individualism index in 
the banks specification was so extremely significant indicates that this is most likely not the case. 
 
On the other side of the spectrum, three of the four industries which we expected not to be 
affected by individualism did meet expectations. The effect of individualism on the mining 
industry was highly insignificant and even had a negative coefficient. This was the least 
powerful result in all of the analyses. The mining industry clearly shows serial autocorrelation in 
price volatility and subsumes both the gold price volatility as well as global systemic volatility. 
The industry also shows a high standard volatility with a large, significant intercept. 
 
The effect of individualism on the mobile telecommunications industry was the next least 
powerful effect. The mobile telecommunications industry relies on its physical infrastructure to 
produce income. Again, autocorrelation is a large driver of volatility as well as systemic 
volatility. The intercept was lower for the mobile telecommunications industry, suggesting a 
lower average industry specific volatility. 
 
The oil & gas producers industry also has an insignificant effect of individualism, but is largely 
affected by oil price volatility and global systemic volatility. Autocorrelation of volatility is also 
a powerful force, but with a very small and largely insignificant intercept, it seems the Oil & Gas 
Producers industry has a low industry specific volatility. 
 
5.2.3 SUMMARY 
 
The three hypotheses tested had varying levels of success. The Tertiary Hypothesis (that 
individualism had no differing effect on regions) was rejected, while Hypothesis 3.1 was 
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generally found to hold true, allowing the conclusion that individualism has different effects on 
different regions, specifically between Western and Eastern regions. The Secondary Hypothesis 
– that overconfidence is the driver of volatility increases in regions of high individualism – was 
also found to generally hold true in that individualism was linked to higher volatility, which 
aligns with previous research on overconfidence. However, the effect of individualism on trading 
volume was inconclusive and could not confirm the generally supported hypothesis that 
overconfidence causes increases in trading volume. 
 
Hypothesis 1, which represented the primary objective of the study, was found to hold true, and 
the statement that individualism has different effects on different industries was accepted. 
Specifically, those industries which were identified as being susceptible to behavioural biases 
due to generally low book to market ratios were to found to be significantly affected by 
individualism, while those which were identified to be relatively immune had no such significant 
relationship. The obvious outlier was the banks industry, which was expected to not be affected 
by individualism due to the fact that most of a bank’s assets are valued on open markets. 
However, an alternative explanation was given for the impact of individualism on banks: the 
concept of individualism drives employee behaviour, resulting in less risk taking activities in 
collectivistic countries and therefore less volatility in those countries. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
 
Behavioural Finance has been gaining traction over the past few decades due to two key points: 
the existence of evidence to indicate that the EMH does not hold and the successful use of 
behavioural factors in describing market returns and volatility. The evidence is constantly 
growing with the number of explanatory factors increasing exponentially. However, no accepted 
methodology or defined set of variables has been found – one of the biggest criticisms of 
Behavioural Finance. The Efficient Markets Hypothesis has endured due to the sound structure 
of its development, the parsimonious nature of its specification and the lack of a fully specified 
alternative (the largest obstacle being the lack of suitable proxies for known behavioural biases). 
In the endeavour to replace the usable specification of the Efficient Markets Hypothesis with the 
more accurate specification of Behavioural Finance, this study analysed the differing effects of 
behavioural variables – specifically individualism – on industries. 
 
The introduction of a GARCH specification in an attempt to remove volatility clustering and 
create a more time-invariant series was an extension of previous literature on the subject. The use 
of GARCH models in volatility modelling is however, present in past literature and has found 
much success in this arena. The resulting residual series’ were modelled using a panel regression 
using the market (as a proxy of the country) as the cross-sectional identifier. A panel model was 
used in order to identify cross-country effects over time. 
 
Variables considered included, the Individualism Index of Hofstede (2001), the variable of focus 
for the current study; the market capitalisation of the industry, the effect of which was suggested 
by Cambell, Lettau, Malkiel and Xu (2001); residual volatility of the MSCI World Index, which 
was an attempt to capture the effect of global volatility since the focus was on country specific 
volatility; a one period lag of the industry volatility to counteract the effect of autocorrelation 
(longer lag periods were also considered but made no meaningful difference to the results); and 
the residual volatility of the gold and oil spot prices were used in the models of the mining and 
oil & gas producers industries respectively in order to capture commodity price volatility in those 
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industries. The same tests were conducted on the trading volume of the industries, however the 
results were deemed inconclusive. 
 
The results of the tests were used to analyse three hypotheses. The third hypothesis being that the 
effect of individualism on industries was independent of country or region. It was concluded that 
the effect of individualism was at least dependent of region, given the results of the analyses 
conducted. It could not however be deduced that the effect of individualism was dependent of 
country since the tests were not conducted at a granular enough level. 
 
The second hypothesis stated that the effect of individualism on industries was transferred via 
overconfidence. This hypothesis could be justified but not confirmed. While it was shown that 
the effect of individualism on industry volatility could be due to overconfidence, the results of 
the analysis done on industry trading volumes could not confirm the hypothesis. 
 
The primary focus of the current study was the hypothesis that individualism has differing effects 
on different industries and the sub-hypotheses that the effect of individualism would be higher or 
lower based on the means from which the industry draws an income. The hypotheses stated that 
industries which have easily valuable assets should be less prone to the effects of behavioural 
biases and therefore individualism should have an insignificant effect and vice versa for those 
which have less easily valuable assets. 
 
The results for the most part supported the hypotheses, with the pharmaceuticals & 
biotechnology and software & computer services industries (both industries which were 
considered to be difficult to value) had significant and strong relationships with individualism. 
The mobile telecommunications, oil & gas producers and mining industries (all of which are 
considered to be easier to value) had insignificant relationships with Individualism. However, the 
banks industries – which was considered relatively easy to value due to the assets in the industry 
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being predominantly market valued, client deposits or easily valued loans – had a strong and 
positive relationship with individualism. 
 
It is posited that this relationship does not stem from the trading activity of 
individualistic/collectivistic traders but rather from the actions of individualistic/collectivistic 
employees. Employees in individualistic cultures may in fact be creating more risk, and therefore 
volatility, for the banks of those cultures. While those employees of collectivistic cultures are 
more restrained, treating the money of their compatriots as if it were their own. 
 
This most intriguing relationship (the effect of individualism on volatility through industry 
employees as opposed to investors) requires further investigation. The focus of the effect of 
cultural factors on security volatility has thus far been on the determination of prices by 
investors. However, there is no reason to assume that this effect does not rather act through other 
agents, namely industry employees or market makers. The relationship between individualism 
and volume/volatility as a whole also deserves further attention and any further investigation 
should take more variables – such as foreign exchange volatility, industry trading volume as a 
regressor and possibly an indicator of strike action (quite pertinent in a South African context at 
least) – into account as well as identifying different methods to model the relationship in order to 
avoid possible spurious results as those of the relationship between individualism and trading 
volume. A more in depth analysis should be made into the driving forces behind the relationship, 
specifically those forces of overconfidence and the self-attribution bias and whether these effects 
influence volatility through trading activity – as is predominantly assumed here – or whether the 
influence in fact occurs through strategic means as is explained by the example of the banks 
industry.  
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8. APPENDIX 
8.1 LINE GRAPHS OF UNTRANSFORMED VOLATILITY 
 
The below graphs represent the monthly volatility of each of the industries as a whole. As can be 
seen, the volatility is generally not normally distributed or stationary, showing signs of changing 
means. The graphs also definitely exhibit signs of volatility clustering. 
 
 
Figure 15 - Volatility diagrams of the Banks and Mining industries 
 
Figure 16 - Volatility diagrams of the Oil & Gas Producers and Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology industries 
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Figure 17 - Volatility diagrams of the Software & Computer Services and Mobile Telecommunications industries 
 
8.2 LINE GRAPHS OF TRANSFORMED VOLATILITY 
 
The graphs below have been log-transformed in order to induce normality in the volatility 
series’. While the movement around the means is more uniformly distributed, the means 
themselves seem to be changing over time, indicating non-stationarity. The results of stationarity 
tests however, indicate that the series’ are stationary. 
 
 
Figure 18 - Volatility diagrams of the log-transformed volatility of the Banks and Mining industries 
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Figure 19 - Volatility diagrams of the log-transformed volatility of the Oil & Gas Producers and Pharmaceuticals & 
Biotechnology industries 
 
Figure 20 - Volatility diagrams of the log-transformed volatility of the Software & Computer Services and Mobile 
Telecommunications industries 
 
8.3 GARCH MODEL RESULTS 
 
The results of the GARCH models given below forms part of the pre-processing of data in 
preparation for panel data regression. The GARCH models themselves have very low and 
sometimes negative R-Squared values, however as discussed earlier this does not necessarily 
mean that the models are misspecificed. The significance of most of the ARCH and GARCH 
variables indicate that the models are appropriate. 
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Table 14 - GARCH model Results for the Banks industry of the JSE 
 
Table 15 - GARCH model Results for the Banks industry of the LSE 
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Table 16 - GARCH model Results for the Banks industry of the NYSE 
 
Table 17 - GARCH model Results for the Banks industry of Shanghai 
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Table 18 - GARCH model Results for the Banks industry of Taiwan 
 
Table 19 - GARCH model Results for the Mining industry of the JSE 
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Table 20 - GARCH model Results for the Mining industry of the LSE 
 
Table 21 - GARCH model Results for the Mining industry of the NYSE 
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Table 22 - GARCH model Results for the Mining industry of Shanghai 
 
Table 23 - GARCH model Results for the Oil & Gas Producers industry of the JSE 
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Table 24 - GARCH model Results for the Oil & Gas Producers industry of the LSE 
 
Table 25 - GARCH model Results for the Oil & Gas Producers industry of the NYSE 
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Table 26 - GARCH model Results for the Oil & Gas Producers industry of Shanghai 
 
Table 27 - GARCH model Results for the Oil & Gas Producers industry of Taiwan 
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Table 28 - GARCH model Results for the Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology industry of the JSE 
 
Table 29 - GARCH model Results for the Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology industry of the LSE 
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Table 30 - GARCH model Results for the Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology industry of the NYSE 
 
Table 31 - GARCH model Results for the Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology industry of Shanghai 
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Table 32 - GARCH model Results for the Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology industry of Taiwan 
 
Table 33 - GARCH model Results for the Software & Computer Services industry of the JSE 
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Table 34  -GARCH model Results for the Software & Computer Services industry of the LSE 
 
Table 35 - GARCH model Results for the Software & Computer Services industry of the NYSE 
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Table 36 - GARCH model Results for the Software & Computer Services industry of Shanghai 
 
Table 37 - GARCH model Results for the Software & Computer Services industry of Taiwan 
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Table 38 - GARCH model Results for the Mobile Telecommunications industry of the JSE 
 
Table 39 - GARCH model Results for the Mobile Telecommunications industry of the LSE 
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Table 40 - GARCH model Results for the Mobile Telecommunications industry of the NYSE 
 
Table 41 - GARCH model Results for the Mobile Telecommunications industry of Shanghai 
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Table 42 - GARCH model Results for the Mobile Telecommunications industry of Taiwan 
 
 
8.4 HAUSMAN TEST RESULTS 
 
Hausman tests were conducted on each of the panel data regression specifications and the results 
below show unequivocally that random effects were not present in each of the panel data sets. As 
can be seen from the cross-section random test statistics and probabilities, the null hypothesis of 
the existence of random effects was rejected for each set. 
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Table 43 - Hausman test results for the Banks, Oil & Gas Producers and Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology industries 
 
Table 44 - Hausman test results for the Software & Computer Services and Mobile Telecommunications industries 
 
